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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUANE P. RUSSELL and VER-
LENE RUSSELL, his wife, and 
JOHN DALE RUSSELL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
HOOPER IRRIGATION COM-
PANY, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 
10929 
The basic issue involved in this matter concerns the 
scope and coverage of a condemnation proceeding be-
tween basically these same parties under another law-
suit and whether, in addition to the condemnation ac-
tion, the plaintiffs in this proceeding can maintain a 
separate trespass action against the condemnor. The 
District Court in and for the Second Judicial District, 
1 
Weber County, ruled that the prior condemnation pro-
ceeding concluded all damage matters between the par-
ties, and granted summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Hooper Irrigation Company is a mutual irri-
gation company engaged in distributing water to its 
stockholders in the western portions of Weber and 
Davis Counties in a rural area. The Company has its 
main canal and canal branches, and from each canal 
branch the different users in the various areas take water 
through separate ditches, referred to as laterals. The 
plaintiffs in this action were water users on one of the 
lateral ditches. 
In an effort to better distribute water and to con-
serve water losses in its canals and lateral ditches the 
defendant Company undertook an extensive program 
of re-arranging the branch canals and laterals and, in 
so doing, converted the former dirt and sod ditches and 
canals into concrete-lined waterways. 
The plaintiffs were water users and stockholders on 
a small lateral ditch which ran west from one of the 
Company's branch canals. They used the ditch along 
with two others in the area-Effie Hooper and Charles 
Pinkham. After considerable study and investigation 
the Company concluded that these three users should 
be placed into a larger ditch system with other users, 
thereby consolidating two ditches into one. In order to 
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effect this arrangement the new and enlarged ditch 
would be placed in the same location as that of the 
former ditch serving the three water users, and would 
extend westerly beyond their properties, and would then 
turn south in the direction of the properties of numerous 
other water users. 
To assist this Court in visualizing the area in-
volved, Exhibits C, D and G of Case No. 35984 (which 
was the condemnation action - incorporated into this 
case by reference and Order (R. IO)) show the general 
condition of the former lateral serving the three water 
users in the late fall of 1959 just before the time that 
the alleged trespass took place. 
The subject lateral ditch was located along the 
north side of the properties of the three water users in 
the fenced portion of the county road. The Company 
secured permission from the Weber County Commis-
sioners and from the first two water users along the 
route (i.e. Charles Pinkham and Effie Hooper) to 
flatten and level the old ditch and to remove the brush 
and trees along the route during the early part of De-
cember, 1959 (R. 7 g). Although the ditch was within 
the county road area, both Pinkham and Hooper owned 
to the center line of the highway. 
This construction work and the manner of filling 
the ditch can best be illustrated by examining Exhibit 
F of Case No. 35984, which shows the filled-in ditch 
opposite the Effie Hooper property at the point where 
the Russell properties commence. However, as will be 
3 
pointed out in argument, the title of the Russells did 
not extend beyond their fence, and included no part of 
the ditch area within the county road. 
As indicated by appellants the construction activi-
ties on the dirt ditch lateral serving the three involved 
water users commenced on or about December 7, 1959. 
At that time the dirt lateral ditch was not carrying any 
irrigation or stock water, inasmuch as all of the water 
had been turned out of the main canal system ( R. 7 g) . 
No use was being made of the lateral ditch for any pur· 
pose whatsoever at the time. 
When it became evident that defendants Russell 
were going to object to the revised irrigation system 
the respondent Company stopped construction activi-
ties at a point at the west end of the Effie Hooper 
property - where the Russell properties commenced 
on the south side of the county road (see Exhibit F -
Case No. 35984). Thereupon, on December 3, 1959, the 
Company, acting through its Board of Directors, 
adopted a resolution providing that eminent domain 
proceedings be commenced pursuant to Sections 73-1-6 
and 73-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to enlarge the 
existing dirt lateral ditch (see Exhibit A - Case No. 
35984). On January 15, 1960, the respondent Com· 
pany filed its Complaint in Case No. 35984 to acquire 
the easement right which defendants Russell had in the 
affected ditch lateral. 
In subsequent court proceedings the action was 
tried to a jury, which assessed damages in favor of de-
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fendants Russell against Hooper Irrigation Company 
in Civil No. 35984 in the total amount of $260.00. That 
judgment has been duly satisfied of record, and these 
defendants contend that all items of damage due to the 
appellants Russell were provided for and determined 
in that proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT BE-
TWEEN THE RUSSELLS AND ALL OTHER 
LITIGANTS WERE CONCLUDED IN THE 
CONDEMNATION LITIGATION. 
Proceeding upon the long established premise that 
in summary judgment cases the facts must be viewed 
most favorably to the appellant, respondent will here 
point out that as a matter of fact and law there are no 
genuine issues left for determination which were not 
concluded in the condemnation proceeding. Under Rule 
56 ( c) it is well to note that the language specifies that 
summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings, 
admissions on file, affidavits and other matter show -
" ... That there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as ·a matter of law." 
It can hardly be imagined that any type of litiga-
tion concludes every possible issue of fact; however, it 
is the position of respondent that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact which remains in this 
alleged trespass action. 
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The condemnation action was originally brought 
against the Russells since the respondent Company was 
affecting an easement right which the Russells had to 
convey water through the former ditch along the public 
street. However, when appellants state in their brief at 
page 6, pursuant to an Affidavit filed by Duane P. 
Russell, that there was a trespass "upon the land of 
the plaintiff ... ", such is not the case. Immediately 
prior to the commencement of condemnation proceed-
ings and the securing of an Order of Occupancy in 
Case No. 35984, the respondent Company did apparent-
ly engage in a technical trespass upon an unused and 
dormant easement right of the Russells in the lands 
of others. Without attempting to get involved in a 
minute argument over the nature and degree of pro-
perty rights, to farm folk in that area the easement 
right of the Russells in the ditch area owned by Effie 
Hooper and Charles Pinkham was not as evident as 
would have been the situation had there been a trespass 
upon land known to have been owned by the Russells. 
At any rate, the Russells originally contended that the 
trespass was on their fee land, but the proceedings in 
Case No. 35984 clearly established that no trespass ac-
tually occurred on their fee land. In the Pre-Trial 
Order in that action (R. 7 i) it was provided: 
" ... With respect to the ownership of the la~d 
upon which said ditch easement is located, it will 
be held that defendants Russell own no part of 
the fee upon which said ditch was located unless 
proof thereof is submitted to opposing counsel 
within thirty (30) days from the date hereof." 
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These appellants never furnished such information, 
the record is devoid of such proof, and the condemna-
tion trial proceeded on the basis of the Russells owning 
an easement right only. 
The only issue which thus presents itself before 
this Court is whether appellants Russell secured full 
compensation for the damage to their easement under 
the statutory provisions allowing joint use of irrigation 
facilities. The answer to this question must be found 
in the condemnation proceedings in Case No. 35984. 
The Pre-Trial Order in the condemnation action 
(Civil No. 35984) required defendants Russell to fur-
nish this respondent with an itemization of the damages 
claimed " ... arising out of and in connection with the 
taking of the property rights described in the com-
plaint:" In fact the very same foregoing words were 
stated by counsel for these appellants in the statement 
so furnished (R. 7 e). Further, in the furnished State-
ment of Claim for Damages the following items were 
included as damages: 
2. Construction of large head gate 
opposite Effie Hooper property ...... $450.00 
3. Construction of large headgate 200 
feet west of headgate previously 
mentioned --------------------------------------------$300.00 
Although these appellants on page 9 of their brief 
state that they" ... did not contain a counterclaim for 
the damage alleged in this suit ... ," they did in fact 
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very definitely include two headgates in the county 
road area to the north of and opposite the 12 acres of 
land bordering the county road area. Actually, one 
of the main items at issue in the condemnation case was 
this very easement in the county roadway area. In 
answer to a special interrogatory submitted to the jury 
concerning this easement in Case No. 35984 ( R. 7 d) 
the jury responded as follows: 
2. Damage to the Russells' irrigation 
easement in the public street, 
if any .................................................... $258.00 
IS/ Allison W. Ogan 
Foreman 
These appellants are in the situation of attempting 
to take two shots at the same target. They overlook 
the basic test of market value in eminent domain cases 
which clearly establish that the measure of damages in 
a case of the type here involved is that of the difference 
in market value of the irrigation easement facility be-
fore and after the imposition of the new facility for irri-
gation purposes in place of the facility previously used 
by appellants. Under the "before" and "after" rule the 
various items affecting the difference in value are con-
sidered - such as headgates and diversion facilities -
and the jury awards an amount which should reflect 
the total diminution in value, if any. Applying this 
rule specifically to the condemnation action heretofore 
tried and its relationship to this case, it should be clearly 
remembered that, as to any headgates in the county 
road area which may have been removed by this respond-
8 
e 
ent during the course of construction there were placed 
substitute facilities in place of those removed so as to 
accomplish substantially what the prior facilities were 
doing. It may well have been that the jury award of 
$258.00 for damage to the appellants' irrigation ease-
ment in the public street in the condemnation proceed-
ing might there have well been an unwarranted re-
covery. In any event, if a double recovery has not 
heretofore been had, there is no justification for giving 
appellants another shot at the very same alleged dam-
age item. 
So as to further assist this Court in arriving at a 
mental picture of the new facility which was created 
in the same location as the former dirt ditch lateral, an 
examination of Exhibits 2, J and H in Case No. 35984 
should point out - as the jury verdict clearly indicates 
- the vastly improved facility made available to these 
appellants and the other water users in the vicinity. 
Appellants' Complaint (R. 1-p. 3) in this matter 
alleges that respondent -
". . . placed heavy earth-moving machinery 
and equipment on the said lateral of the plain-
tiffs', filled a large portion of the lateral with 
earth, and removed and destroyed numerous con-
crete and steel headgates and other water-control 
facilities in said lateral; ... " 
Since these were the alleged acts of trespass and dam-
age - and since the only possible items of damage in-
volving facilities having cost value were the headgates 
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and other water control facilities which were fully and 
adequately covered in the condemnation case, it is diffi-
cult to see where any other possible item of damage 
could be raised in this trespass proceeding. Certainly, 
when this problem arose in December of 1959, no use 
was being made of the facility. And there is no claim 
that the new facility was not in condition to adequately 
substitute for the old facility when the irrigation season 
commenced in the spring of 1960. 
So that there will be no question that the condem-
nation proceeding adequately covered any and all dam-
ages to the irrigation easement, Instruction No. 2 ( 2) 
of the Court to the jury in Civil No. 35984 is here 
included: 
"The amount of damages done, if any, to the 
defendants' easement for irrigation water trans-
fer in the public street in question. Such dam-
ages are the difference in the value of the irriga-
tion easement before the taking by the Hooper 
Irrigation Company's right to join in the use of 
the ditch and the value of such joint use of the 
easement to the defendant landowner's holding 
lands, served by the ditch after the construction 
of the project. That is, such a sum as will justly 
compensate the defendants so they are no better 
or worse off, or no poorer or richer than they 
would have been if such a taking had not 
occurred." 
In sub-portion ( 1) of Instruction No. 2 the lower 
Court further elaborated on the easement in the street 
area and any construction damages, as fallows: 
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" . . . Evidence of damag~ done to the de-
fendants' holdings during construction, may be 
considered in determining said value but are not 
binding or necessarily, or likely, to be the market 
price of such an easement, but the amount must 
be equal to or greater than the actual damage in 
the case to said land and improvements. The 
value of such an easement is defined as the price 
one who desired such an easement, but not obli-
gated to buy it, would pay for the easement; and 
the value a person, who was not obligated to sell 
such an easement, would sell it for under the 
circumstances." 
It is very clear that the lower Court fully instructed 
the jury under the evidence as to the relationship be-
tween any construction damages to the easement and 
its "before" and "after" market value. As such the 
damages complained of by appellants in this trespass 
action have been completely and fully covered, and there 
is no issue of damages left for this matter to determine. 
Counsel for appellants, in a letter addressed to the 
Clerk of the Second District Court on May 11, 1961, 
wherein he made a suggestion that ". . . the two cases 
should be consolidated for trial ... ," just about hit 
the nail on the head when he further indicated in his 
letter as follows: 
"There are two cases involving substantially 
the same matter." 
See File No. 35984 
As illustrative of the actual benefit the Russells 
will receive over years to come by using the new ditch 
system which will be Company maintained - as dis-
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tinguished from their obligation to maintain a substan-
tial portion of the old ditch lateral - Instruction No. 3, 
given by the lower Court in the condemnation action in 
Case No. 35984, is here included: 
"You are instructed that under the law the 
plaintiff has the right to enter upon and enlarge 
an existing irrigation ditch which may be used 
by others for the purpose of conveying its own 
water with that of the defendants in an enlarged 
ditch. In this respect, the law provides that the 
plaintiff shall bear its proportionate burden of 
operational costs and upkeep, as well as the initial 
construction costs, of the enlarged ditch system. 
In this case, the plaintiff, Hooper Irrigation 
Company, has, in fact, paid the cost of the en-
larged ditch system and has further agreed to 
maintain such enlarged ditch system without any 
request for reimbursement from the Russells for 
the use of the enlarged ditch system which the 
Russells may make in the future." 
(I tali cs added) 
POINT II 
THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST 
HAVE BEEN BEFORE THE LOWER COURT 
IN BOTH CASES. 
In their brief the appellants raise the novel and 
interesting argument that only appellants and respond-
ent, Hooper Irrigation Company, " ... appear in both 
the condemnation case and the present case." From this 
premise they argue that the other defendants in this 
case - not being parties to the condemnation suit -
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should be kept before the Court in this alleged trespass 
action. However, as pointed out in their own brief and 
in the respective files, all of the remaining defendants 
are either water users farther down the new enlarged 
ditch system who hold stock in the Hooper Irrigation 
Company, or are some of the workmen and contractors 
employed and engaged by the Hooper Irrigation Com-
pany in the construction of the new ditch facility. The 
Hooper Irrigation Company is the real party in inter-
est, and has always been the one charged with any lia-
bility for damages in both cases. 
What appellants are attempting to state to the 
Court now is that they should be entitled to collect once 
from the Hooper Irrigation Company in the condemna-
tion proceeding, and then to collect again from the other 
defendants, if necessary, in the trespass action. That 
the law allows but one recovery for a given wrong is 
so clear as to require no authority at this point. Having 
recovered for the damages to the irrigation easement 
(including as an element of damages the consideration 
of construction damages as provided for in the lower 
Court's Instruction to the Jury), appellants cannot 
recover again from defendants in this case who were not 
parties to the prior condemnation action. 
POINT III 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT RE-
COVERABLE IN A TRESPASS ACTION 
WHERE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE 
NOT PRESENT. 
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Because appellant in its proposed trespass action 
claims the right to recover punitive damages, mention 
should be made at this point regarding the legal status 
of a punitive damage claim where there are no recover-
able compensatory damages present. As to this matter 
the rule is very definite that there can be no basis for 
the recovery of punitive damages in the absence of 
compensatory damages. In 22 Am. J ur. 2d, Par. 241, 
at page 329, it is stated: 
"Applying the rule that there is no cause of 
action for exemplary damages alone to a case 
where the complainant has attached his claim to 
a cause of action requiring allegation and proof 
of compensatory damages, failure to allege and 
to prove compensatory damages will prevent the 
complainant from sustaining or recovering an 
award of exemplary damages ... " 
In Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P. 2d 456 
( 1954) , this Court held error to exist in allowing 
$5,000.00 as punitive damages. The case concerned an 
accounting for partnership profits and damages. On 
page 459 this Court said: 
"Defendants next contend that the court 
erred in allowing $5,000.00 punitive damages. 
We agree. As was the case with compensatory 
damages, there are no specific p~adings, only 
a general allegation of fraud in the amended 
complaint. Standing alone, the failure to. set 
forth a specific pleading may not be fatal smce 
the damages may follow as a conclusion of law 
from the allegation of fraud, 15 Am. J ur., Dam· 
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ages, Sec. 304; however, the general rule is that 
there can be no punitive damages without com-
pensatory damages based on the tort ... " 
In their brief (Memorandum for Plaintiffs) filed 
in the lower Court objecting to the Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment (R. 11), appellants admitted the fore-
going to be the law: 
"With respect to the first point, we admit that 
punitive damages cannot be recovered without 
the recovery of compensatory damages; ... " 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of this respondent that Judge 
Cowley was fully warranted in granting summary judg-
ment in favor of the respondents for the reason that no 
genuine issue of law or fact remained for consideration 
in this trespass action inasmuch as all items of damage 
were adequately covered in the companion condemna-
tion action, and that there is no basis for any further 
relief in favor of appellants in this proceeding. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the lower Court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Respondents 
15 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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